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FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY




Events are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full his-
tory of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events 
(ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental sub-
stances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged access), 
and, among the latter, pure mental substances (ones which do not include a 
physical substance as an essential part). Humans are pure mental substances. 
An argument for this is that it seems conceivable that I could exist without 
my body. An objection to this argument is that ‘I’ refers to my body, and so 
what seems conceivable is not metaphysically possible. My response to this 
objection is that ‘I’ is an informative designator and so necessarily we know 
to what it refers, and it does not refer to my body.
I seek in this paper to defend the view that each of us on Earth consists of 
two parts, a physical body and a non-physical soul.
I begin by defining some technical terms. I define a substance as a thing, 
a component of the world. Thus tables, stars, and persons are substances. I 
define a property as a characteristic, which belongs to one substance (such 
as being yellow, or having a mass of two pounds), or is a relation between 
substances (such as being-taller-than or lying-between). I define an event 
as the instantiation of a property in a particular substance or substances 
at a particular time (such as this tie being brown at 4 pm on June 4th 2006, 
or Birmingham now lying between Manchester and London). A property 
of a substance is an essential property if necessarily that substance would 
not exist without that property. Thus occupying space is an essential prop-
erty of my desk; it could not continue to exist and yet occupy no volume 
of space. The history of the world just is all the events which occur. It is 
this substance existing (that is having its essential properties) for a period, 
now acquiring this non-essential property, now losing that non-essential 
property, now acquiring this non-essential relation to another substance, 
now losing this relation, and then not existing any more. It includes for 
example the existence of this table for a certain period, the table being 
brown, then being painted red, then being six metres from that wall, then 
becoming only three metres from the wall; and so on until it exists no 
more. If you knew all the events which occurred, that is which properties 
were instantiated in which substances when, you would know the whole 
history of the world.
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I shall understand by a mental property one to whose instantiation any 
substance in whom it is instantiated necessarily has privileged access on 
all occasions of its instantiation, and a physical property one to whose in-
stantiation the substance concerned necessarily has no privileged access on 
any occasion of its instantiation. Someone has privileged access to whether 
a property P is instantiated in him in the sense that—given that he knows 
what it is for something to have P (that is, has the concept of P)—whatever 
ways others have of finding out whether P is instantiated in him, it is logi-
cally possible that he can use, but he has a further way (by experiencing it) 
which it is not logically possible that others can use. A pure mental prop-
erty may then be defined as one whose instantiation does not entail the 
instantiation of a physical property. I shall understand by a mental event 
one to whose occurrence the substance involved in it has privileged access 
; and by a physical event one to whose occurrence there is no privileged 
access; and by a pure mental event one whose occurrence does not entail 
the occurrence of any physical event. Mental events (normally) involve the 
instantiation of mental properties, pure mental events (normally) involve 
the instantiation only of pure mental properties, and physical events (nor-
mally) involve the instantiation only of physical properties.1
Evidently—more evidently than anything else—there really are mental 
events, involving the instantiation of mental properties, as we know from 
our own experience. They include our perceptions (my seeing the desk) 
and intentional actions (my intentionally moving the desk). Others can 
find out what (probably) I am seeing or doing intentionally by studying 
my behaviour and brain. But I have a way of knowing about what I am 
seeing and what I am doing intentionally other than the ways available to 
the best other student of my behaviour or brain: I actually experience per-
ceiving and intentionally acting. Neither of the two events which I have 
just mentioned are pure mental events, for they each include a physical 
component. My seeing the desk entails that the desk exists, and so does 
my moving the desk. Yet each of these mental events also includes a pure 
mental event as a component—my believing that there is a desk in front of 
me, and my trying to move the desk. Our mental lives consist of a succes-
sion of pure mental events. They include the pattern of colour in my visual 
field, pains and thrills, beliefs, thoughts and feelings, and the intentions 
which I try to realize through my body or in some other way. My being 
in pain at midday yesterday, or having a red image in my visual field, or 
thinking about lunch, or forming the intention of going to London—are 
1My definitions of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ properties have the consequence that there 
are some properties which are neither mental nor physical—let us call them ‘neutral prop-
erties.’ They include formal properties (e.g., ‘being a substance’) and disjunctive proper-
ties (e.g.,‘being in pain or weighing ten stone’). The existence of such properties leads to 
my including the ‘normally’ in my definitions of the different kinds of event. For although 
all events which involve only the instantiation of (pure) mental properties are (pure) 
mental events, there are (pure) mental events which involve the instantiation of neutral 
properties, e.g., the event of me being-in-pain-or- weighing-ten-stone. And analogously 
for physical events.
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also such that if others could find out about them by some method, I could 
find out about them by the same method. Others can learn about my pains 
and thoughts by studying my behaviour and perhaps also by studying my 
brain. Yet I too could study my behaviour—I could watch a film of myself; 
I could study my brain—via a system of mirrors and microscopes—just as 
well as anyone else could. But, of course, I have a way of knowing about 
my pains, thoughts, and suchlike other than those available to the best 
other student of my behaviour or brain: I actually experience them. But 
the events I have just been discussing contain no other event to which 
there is public access. Consequently, they must be distinct from brain 
events, or any other bodily events. A Martian who came to earth, captured 
a human bring, and inspected his brain could discover everything that 
was happening in that brain but would still wonder, “Does this human re-
ally feel anything when I stamp on his toe?” It is a further fact beyond the 
occurrence of brain events that there are pains and after-images, thoughts, 
and intentions. You would certainly not know the whole history of world 
if you knew only which physical events had occurred.
In making this point, I do not of course deny that most of my pure men-
tal events are caused by my brain events. Clearly most of the passive men-
tal events—the ones which we find ourselves having, sensations, thoughts, 
beliefs and desires—are caused at least in part by brain events, themselves 
often caused by further bodily events. For example, a toothache is caused 
by a brain event itself caused by tooth decay. But plausibly some mental 
events are caused, at least in part by other mental events—plausibly often 
a thought that such-and-such is the answer to a mathematical problem is 
caused in part by thoughts that certain other mathematical propositions 
are true. And it certainly seems that bodily events are often caused (via 
brain events) by mental events—my closing my books is often caused by 
a decision to finish working.
To know the whole history of the world you would need to know not 
merely which properties had been instantiated, but in which substances 
they had been instantiated—who had the toothache or the thought. I de-
fine a mental substance as a substance to whose existence that substance 
necessarily has privileged access, and a physical substance as a substance 
to whose existence that substance necessarily has no privileged access, that 
is a public substance. Since having privileged access to anything is itself a 
mental property, and some one who has any other mental property has that 
one, mental substances are just those for which some mental properties are 
essential. A pure mental substance is one for which no physical parts are 
essential and for which only pure mental properties are essential (together 
with any properties entailed by the possession of pure mental properties). 
(Such a pure mental substance may have, contingently—that is, non-essen-
tially—also physical properties: and also have—contingently—physical 
substances among its parts. That is, it could gain or lose such physical prop-
erties or parts without ceasing to exist.) Now I and my hearers are human 
beings, persons of a particular kind. A person would not exist unless he had 
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a capacity for a mental life (a capacity to have sensations, thoughts etc.); and 
having such a capacity is itself a mental property (one to the instantiation 
of which in a subject he has privileged access). Hence persons are mental 
substances, although as far as anything I have said so far is concerned, they 
might need some physical properties or parts (e.g., a body), as well as a 
mental property, in order to exist. I shall be arguing in due course that not 
merely are we mental substances but we are pure mental substances. That 
does not mean that we do not have bodies, only that we do not need them 
in order to exist.
Now what constitutes a substance being the same substance as a pre-
vious substance? What constitutes this desk being the same desk as was 
here last week? First, the two substances have to belong to the same spe-
cies of substance. This desk can only be the same substance as some sub-
stance last week if that one was also a desk. This person can only be the 
same as that person if they are both persons. Secondly (dependent on the 
kind of substance involved) they have to have all or most of the same 
parts, or parts obtained by gradual replacement from the previous parts. 
Parts themselves are also substances. Different species of substances be-
long to different genera (different wider kinds), such as artefacts (things 
such as desks which people make),organisms (plants and animals), 
simples (things without parts), and what philosophers call mereological 
compounds (lumps of stuff). For substances of different genera different 
numbers of parts have to be retained in order for the substance to be the 
same substance. Artefacts have to have most of the same parts; for my 
desk to be the same as the desk in my study last week it has to have most 
of the same parts. Organisms, such as plants, may over the course of time 
have all their parts replaced, but the replacement has to be gradual—now 
this part, now that part, and the new parts have to play somewhat the 
same role in the organism as the replaced parts did. At the other extreme, 
‘simple’ substances which are not composed of separable parts and thus 
in effect have just one part, have to continue to have that part; plausi-
bly electrons are like this. And by definition of ‘mereological compound,’ 
mereological compounds have to have all the same parts.
So what constitutes the identity of a human person? The philosophical-
ly most popular theory is that we are the same person if we have enough 
of the same physical parts (or ones obtained by gradual replacement) con-
nected with instantiated mental properties: my being a person consists in 
me having mental properties, my being the same person as some person 
last week consists in me having more-or-less the same physical parts. One 
may think that certain parts are more important than others—a person 
needs the same brain, or most of the same brain in order to continue to ex-
ist. But the main point on this theory is that my continuing to exist consists 
in some number of particular physical parts of me continuing to exist, con-
nected with mental properties. This theory, however, must be mistaken, 
because knowing what has happened to all physical parts of me (what-
ever your particular account of which of them are crucial), will not always 
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show you what has happened to me. Some particular fate for all the physi-
cal parts is compatible with me having either of two very different fates.
Let me illustrate this with the example of brain transplants. The brain 
consists of two hemispheres and a brain stem. There is good evidence 
that humans can survive and behave as conscious beings if much of one 
hemisphere is destroyed. Now imagine my brain (hemispheres plus 
brain-stem) divided into two, and each half-brain taken out of my skull 
and transplanted into the empty skull of a body from which a brain has 
just been removed; and there to be added to each half-brain from some 
other brain (e.g., the brain of my identical twin or a clone of me) whatever 
other parts (e.g., more brain-stem, and some of the other hemisphere) are 
necessary in order for the transplant to take and for there to be two liv-
ing persons with lives of conscious experiences. I cannot see that there 
are any insuperable theoretical difficulties standing in the way of such an 
operation. (Indeed that is a mild understatement—I fully expect it to be 
done one day.) We are, therefore, entitled to ask a further question—if this 
operation were done and we then had two living persons, both with lives 
of conscious experiences, which (if either of them) would be me? Prob-
ably both would to some extent behave like me and claim to be me and to 
remember having done what I did; for behaviour and speech depend, in 
large part, on mental states themselves caused by brain-states, and there 
are considerable overlaps between the properties of the two hemispheres 
of any one human being (the “information” carried by them) which give 
rise to those mental states. But both persons would not be me. For if they 
were both identical with me, they would be the same person as each other 
(if a is the same as b, and b is the same as c, then a is the same as c) and 
they are not. They now have different experiences and lead different lives. 
There remain three other possibilities: that the person with my right half-
brain is me, or that the person with my left half-brain is me, or that neither 
is me. It may be that cutting the brain stem destroys the original person 
once and for all, and that, although repairing the severed stem creates two 
new persons, neither of them is me. You may think that it is just a matter 
of definition which of these three possibilities the case; you can say what 
you like—there would be no real difference. But it cannot be a matter of 
definition whether I survive a brain operation and what my subsequent 
life will be like. Yet even after the experiment is done, no one (not even I, 
if I survive) can know for certain whether I have survived and what then 
is my fate. Even if one subsequent person resembles the earlier me more 
in character and memory claims than does the other, that one may not be 
me. Maybe I will survive the operation but be changed in character and 
have lost much of my memory as a result of it, in consequence of which 
the other subsequent person will resemble the earlier me more in his pub-
lic behaviour than I will.
Some philosophers have supposed that the result of the operation would 
be that each of the later persons would be partly me. I cannot myself make 
much sense of this supposition. But even if this is a possible result of the 
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operation, it cannot be a necessary truth that the operation will have this 
result, because the history of all the physical bits and all the mental prop-
erties associated with them is compatible with both subsequent persons 
not being only partly me. It is still a possibility that, just as the resulting 
person is fully me if my heart is replaced, so one of the resulting persons 
is fully me if half his brain is replaced. If however we include both sub-
sequent persons being partly me as a possible result of the operation, we 
would now be ignorant about which out of four possible results to the 
operation had in fact occurred.
Derek Parfit has claimed that what matters in such cases is not identity 
(that is, which—if any—later person is me), but what he calls “survival,” 
which is for Parfit a matter of degree.2 I “survive” on Parfit’s definition to 
the extent to which the mental life of some later person involves “apparent 
memories of” and is caused by my mental life. What matters, according to 
Parfit, is whether some later person “apparently remembers” my past ex-
periences because they cause him to seem to remember those experiences. 
But, as Parfit would, I think, acknowledge, his view is counter-intuitive. 
The mere existence of a later person whose mental events are in large part 
caused by and involve apparent memory of my past life is not what I hope 
for, when I hope to survive an operation (in the normal sense of ‘survive’). 
I want that person to be me, even if I cannot remember much of my previ-
ous life. It would need some very strong philosophical arguments to show 
that my normal hope is incoherent and so we should make do with hoping 
for Parfitian survival. The two such arguments normally deployed are so 
weak as to be hardly worth calling arguments. There is the argument that 
in such a situation we would never be able to discover which person was 
me. But if so, so what? Humans are not omniscient. Why should we expect 
them to be able to discover this? And then there is the argument that, if a 
person being me is all-or-nothing, as we take away more and more of my 
neurones and replace them with neurones from elsewhere, just replacing 
one last neurone would make someone to cease to be me. True, but so 
what? Quantum theory and Chaos theory have taught us that very small 
causes can produce very large effects.
Reflection on this thought experiment shows that, however much we 
know about what has happened to my brain—we might know exactly 
what has happened to every atom in it—and to every other physical part 
of me, we would not know what has happened to me. And note that the 
extra truth is not a truth about what kind of mental life is connected to 
each brain. It is not a truth about mental properties, about what thoughts 
and feelings and purposes the revived person has. Rather, the extra truth, 
the truth about whether I have survived, is a truth about WHO has those 
thoughts and feelings, that is, in which substance those properties are 
instantiated. And, since the continuing existence of a substance involves 
continuity of its parts (either having the same parts or ones obtained by 
2Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), chap. 12.
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gradual replacement of parts), and since mere knowledge of what has 
happened to every physical part of me does not provide the answer to 
whether I have survived, my survival must be (at least in part) a truth 
about what has happened to a non-physical part, that is, a pure mental 
substance. So there must be more to me than the matter of which my body 
and brain are made, a further essential non-physical part whose continu-
ing in existence is necessary for the brain (and so body) to which it is con-
nected (that is causally interacts with) to be my brain (and body).
All that I have shown so far is that the survival of a non-physical part 
(let’s call it my soul) is necessary for my survival; but that leaves open the 
possibility that some physical part or other of my previous body-and since 
it is the brain which sustains my mental life, it surely has to be a brain 
part—has to be combined with my soul in order for me to survive. But 
now consider another thought experiment. Suppose I have a severe brain 
disease affecting the right brain hemisphere. The only way to keep the 
body functioning is to replace this hemisphere. So the doctors remove my 
current right-hemisphere and replace it by a right hemisphere taken from 
my clone or identical twin, and join it to my left hemisphere. Alas, the 
disease spreads to the left hemisphere, and so that too has to be replaced. 
Have I survived or not? Again, who can say? But clearly my survival is 
perfectly compatible with all the physical parts which originally composed 
my brain being destroyed. Perhaps you may suggest that I survive if and 
only if the replacement of bits is done gradually, so that for example the 
new right hemisphere has to interact with the old left-hemisphere for at 
least two minutes before the latter is replaced, if I am to survive. But while 
that might be physically necessary for my survival, to suppose that a two-
minute as opposed to a mere one-minute contact of new parts with old 
is what constitutes my survival is absurd. My survival is compatible with 
any such conditions not being satisfied, and the satisfaction of any such 
conditions is compatible with my not surviving; but the extent to which 
such conditions are satisfied might be evidence of my survival. Whether I 
survive is a further truth about the world additional to truths about what 
has happened to all the physical bits of me, and quite apart from which 
mental properties are associated with those physical bits. And so it must 
be a truth about what happens to a non-physical part of me which I am 
calling my soul. I am my soul plus whatever brain (and body) it is con-
nected to. Normally my soul goes when my brain goes, but in unusual 
circumstances (such as when my brain is split) it is uncertain where it 
goes. So long as I continue to have thoughts and feelings and purposes, I 
have survived any operation—whatever happens to any particular physi-
cal parts of me. So my soul is the essential part of me—its survival is nec-
essary and sufficient for me to survive.
But don’t I have to have some brain or body in order to exist? Maybe, 
given the way things work in the world at present (that is, given the laws 
of nature which currently operate in the world), that is physically neces-
sary. Souls can exist and function only when connected to a functioning 
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brain. But the issue is whether this is absolutely or metaphysically neces-
sary, necessary whatever the laws of nature are. I noted earlier that I have 
a body if and only if there is some physical substance with which I interact 
causally in certain ways. But there is no incompatibility in supposing that 
these connections with a body are broken totally at an instant and yet I go 
on having thoughts and feelings; and maybe even come to have the abil-
ity to make a difference to the world and learn about it without having to 
do so through one particular physical substance. But a substance can only 
continue to exist if its parts are the same or replaced only gradually, and so 
if its physical parts are destroyed at an instant it can only continue to exist 
if a non-physical part of it continues to exist and if the existence of that 
part is sufficient for its existence. My argument above shows that I have 
now already a non-bodily part, my soul, whose continuing in existence is 
sufficient for my continuing in existence.
It follows that my body is only a contingent part of me. Since my hav-
ing physical properties (e.g., weight and size) entails my body having 
these properties, and my having pure mental properties entails only the 
existence of my soul, it follows that physical properties belong to me in 
virtue of belonging to my body and pure mental properties belong to me 
in virtue of belonging to my soul. (Impure mental properties belong to me 
in virtue of my soul having certain pure mental properties and my body 
having certain physical properties, and the instantiation of properties of 
one kind causing the instantiation of properties of the other kind.) What 
applies to me applies to all other humans and any other conscious beings 
there may be. The full story of the world will include what happens to 
each of our two parts—it will include the thoughts and feelings of souls, 
as well as the weights and volumes of bodies (as well as causal relations 
between these).
My arguments so far have depended on claims that certain events are 
compatible or incompatible with other events, e.g., my surviving is com-
patible with my body being destroyed; or on claims that certain events 
involve others, e.g., that every part of me being destroyed at an instant 
involves me being destroyed. How do I know which events are compat-
ible with, and which events involve other events? In so far as events are 
described in ways which convey the essence of the substances, properties, 
etc. involved, it is a pure a priori exercise to detect whether the descrip-
tion of one event is compatible with or involves the description of an-
other event. When we know what we are talking about, mere thought can 
show what that involves. The compatibility is logical compatibility, the 
incompatibility is logical incompatibility, the involvement is entailment. 
A proposition p is logically compatible with a proposition q, if and only 
if (p&q) entails no contradiction; p is logically incompatible with q if and 
only if (p&q) entails a contradiction. You can show that some supposition 
entails a contradiction by deducing the contradiction. You can show that 
‘A is taller than B, and B is taller than C, and C is taller than A’ entails a 
contradiction by deducing from it ‘(A is taller than B) and not (A is taller 
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than B).’ That some supposition entails no contradiction is evidenced by 
no one yet having drawn a contradiction out of it, and by the fact that we 
can apparently make sense of the world being the way the supposition 
supposes, that is, we can postulate a more detailed supposition which is 
more evidently logically possible (that is, more evidently entails no con-
tradiction) and entails the supposition in question. To take an example far 
away from our present concerns, how could one show that there being 
more than one space is logically possible? A space is a collection of places 
at some distance in some direction from each other? There would be two 
spaces if there are two collections of places, members of each collection be-
ing at some distance in some direction from each other but not at any dis-
tance in any direction from any member of the other collection. I can show 
that this is logically possible only by describing such a world in detail in a 
comprehensible way (as for example in C. S. Lewis’s Narnia stories), and 
by trying and failing to derive a contradiction therefrom.
But there is more to the compatibility of events than logical compatibil-
ity in the stated sense, and events may involve other events without there 
being the kind of entailment just described. Thirty five years ago Kripke3 
and Putnam4 drew our attention to the fact that substances (properties, 
events, etc.) may be picked out by referring expressions which are rather 
uninformative as to the nature of what is picked out. In that case, although 
there may be a truth that the object picked out could or could not coexist 
with some other object, or involve the existence of some other object, you 
would need first to discover empirically (a posteriori) more fully what had 
been picked out before you could know this.
Consider the proposition ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’ as uttered by 
early Greeks, where Phosphorus is “the morning star,” the bright planet 
(as we now know it to be) which often appears before sunrise in the morn-
ing sky, and Hesperus is “the evening star,” the bright planet which often 
appears after sunset in the evening sky. We know that these planets are the 
same planet; the early Greeks did not know this. Given what ‘Hesperus’ 
picks out and what ‘Phosphorus’ picks out, ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’ 
not merely is not, but could not be true—since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phospho-
rus’ pick out the same planet; and a thing must be identical with itself. 
Hesperus could not exist without Phosphorus existing, and conversely. 
Yet ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’ entails no contradiction—merely under-
standing the proposition would not enable you to see that what it asserted 
could not be the case. So even if being me does not entail being embodied 
(that is, there is no contradiction in ‘I exist without my body’)—an op-
ponent may suggest—maybe it is not possible for me to exist without my 
body existing because the existence of me involves the existence of my 
3S. Kripke, “Identity and Necessity” in Identity and Individuation, ed. M. K. Munitz (New 
York: New York University Press, 1971); and “Naming and Necessity” in Semantics of Natural 
Language,, ed. D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972).
4H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” republished in his Mind, Language, and Reality: 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
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body. Even though there is no logical entailment of propositions here, the 
nature of what is in fact picked out by ‘me’ and ‘my body’ has this conse-
quence—it may be suggested. ‘I cannot exist without my body’ would be 
what philosophers call an a posteriori metaphysical necessity, a necessity 
as hard as the normal a priori logical necessity, but one which can only be 
discovered by empirical investigation (e.g., into the nature of Hesperus or 
me), not by pure reasoning.
Metaphysical a posteriori necessity arises if you can know how to use the 
designating expressions (‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’) on some occasions 
(e.g., when the object exhibits certain features) without knowing the nature 
of what is picked out, and so without knowing what constitutes being the 
same object on other occasions and so without being able to recognize that 
object on other occasions. We use ‘Hesperus’ to pick out a planet when it has 
the characteristic of appearing after sunset in the evening sky; but for any 
planet to be that planet it has to have (roughly) the same parts, that is to be 
made of the same matter. But you can refer to it without having discovered 
of what matter it is made and so without being able to identify it on other 
occasions and so in ignorance of whether it is the same planet as Phospho-
rus. Some of the other words which we use for picking out substances or 
properties or substance-kinds (e.g., ‘water’ as used in the eighteenth centu-
ry) also pick out something as of that kind in virtue of superficial properties 
(e.g., being the stuff in our rivers and seas), when what constitutes being 
that substance or property or substance-kind is a matter of the properties 
which underlie the superficial ones (e.g., being made of molecules of H2O) 
which may be present when the superficial ones are not. So, in ignorance of 
the chemical constitution of water, we would not be able to say whether or 
not sometimes stuff found elsewhere than in our rivers and seas is water or 
not. Let us call such words as ‘water’ (as used in the eighteenth century) or 
‘Hesperus’ (as used by early Greeks) uninformative designators.
However, most of the words we use to pick out properties (e.g., ‘green’ 
or ‘square’), as opposed to substances, are not of this character. What 
makes a property the property of being green is what is visible on the 
surface and not what underlies the visible; and in consequence of that 
we can (when favourably positioned, faculties in working order, and not 
subject to illusion) recognize when some new surface is green and when 
it is not merely in virtue of knowing what the word ‘green’ means. And 
the same goes for most of the words by which we pick out pure mental 
properties such as ‘being in pain’ and ‘having a red image’; that is why 
we can know that pure mental events are not the same as physical events. 
Such words I shall call informative designators. When all our referring 
expressions are informative designators, we know the essence of what is 
being designated and hence we can identify new instances of the objects.5 
5More precisely, if you have linguistic knowledge of the rules for using an informative 
designator of an object (substance, property, or whatever), then you can apply it correctly 
to any object if and only if (1) you are favourably positioned, (2) your faculties are in work-
ing order, and (3) you believe that (1) and (2). Thus ‘green’ being an informative designator 
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In such cases mere a priori reflection will tell us which events are compat-
ible with and which events involve which other events; the compatibility 
is then the logical possibility of co-occurrence, and involvement is logical 
entailment. Metaphysical necessity and possibility is in these cases just a 
matter of logical necessity and possibility. Mere a priori reflection will tell 
us that nothing can be red and green all over, or square and round at the 
same time. A priori reflection is not of course infallible, but the possibility 
of mistake does not arise from ignorance of some recondite empirical fact, 
but from a lack of imagination preventing us from seeing a logical entail-
ment or incompatibility.
Now what sort of designator is ‘I’ (or ‘Richard Swinburne,’ as used by 
me)? These seem to be informative designators. If I know how to use these 
words, I cannot be mistaken about when to apply them—when favour-
ably positioned, with faculties in working order, and not subject to illu-
sion; and when I am as favourably positioned as possible and considering 
applying these words to a person in virtue of his being a subject of experi-
ence, no mistake at all is possible. I am, in Shoemaker’s phrase, “immune 
to error though misidentification.”6 I cannot recognize that some experi-
ence (e.g., pain) is occurring and wonder whether it is mine or not, in the 
way that I can see a planet in the morning sky and yet wonder whether the 
planet at which I am looking is Hesperus. My knowledge of how to use ‘I,’ 
like my knowledge of how to use ‘green’ and ‘square,’ means that I know 
the nature of what I am talking about when I use the words. Mere a priori 
reflection will show what my existence involves and with what it is com-
patible. Hence there is no possibility that what I am picking out by ‘I’ has 
an underlying essence which requires me to be embodied. My opponent is 
misguided in trying to make a comparison to the Hesperus/Phosphorous 
situation. Hence, since my existing does not entail my body existing, it 
follows that my existing does not involve my body existing; I am therefore 
a pure mental substance, essentially a soul. And since I can exist without 
my body merely in virtue of being a person, other people can do the same. 
Each of us is a pure mental substance; we may temporarily have physical 
properties and so a body and it may be good for us that we do. But our 
existing does not as such involve our having a body.
Of course I can still misremember what I did in the past, and indeed 
misremember how I used the word ‘I’ in the past. But this kind of problem 
arises with every claim whatsoever about the past. ‘Green’ is an informa-
tive designator of a property, but I may still misremember which things 
means that someone who knows what ‘green’ means can apply it to an object correctly when 
(1) the light is daylight and he is not too far away from the object, (2) his eyes are in working 
order, and he believes that (1) and (2). Someone is subject to illusion if either {(1) and (2)} and 
not-(3) or {either not-(1) or not-(2)} and (3). By contrast, (the designator words having their 
pre-modern senses) however favourably positioned you are and however well your faculties 
are working, you may not be able to identify correctly some liquid not in our rivers and seas 
as ‘water,’ or some planet not in the evening sky as ‘Hesperus.’
6Sydney Shoemaker, “Introspection and the Self” in Self-Knowledge, ed. Q. Cassam (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 82.
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were green and even what I meant by ‘green’ in the past. The difference 
between informative and uninformative designators is that (when my fac-
ulties are in working order, I am favourably positioned and not subject 
to illusion) I can recognize which objects are correctly picked out at the 
present time by informative designators, but not generally when they are 
picked out by uninformative designators (in the absence of further infor-
mation). And so I know what a claim about the past or future amounts to 
when it is made by informative designators, but not when it is made by 
uninformative designators. I know what would constitute a future or past 
experience being mine, what it is for some future or past person to be me. 
Not so with Hesperus or water. I do not know what would constitute a 
past or future substance being water or Hesperus if I am merely in the po-
sition of the ‘water’ user in the eighteenth century, or the ‘Hesperus’ user 
in the early ancient world
For me to exist, I need only to have some pure mental properties. I 
do not need to have any particular mental properties. I pick myself out 
as the subject of certain currently experienced mental properties. But I 
would pick out the same substance if I used less or more of the prop-
erties of which I am currently aware as co-instantiated. Thus suppose I 
pick out myself as the subject of two separate sensations (say, visual and 
tactual sensations). But if at the same time I also had two other sensations 
(say, auditory and gustatory), I could have picked out the same myself by 
means of those latter sensations. And if I had done so, the fact that I had 
the former (visual and tactual sensations) would have been irrelevant to 
who was picked out. But then the same person would have been picked 
out had I not had those (visual and tactual) sensations at all, the only ones 
I did have. So I would have been the same person if I had had quite other 
sensations instead. And a person having all the mental and other proper-
ties which I have is not enough to guarantee that that person is me. For we 
can conceive of a world exactly like our world in all qualitative respects in 
which someone with (qualitatively) the same life history as me lectures to 
people who have (qualitatively) exactly the same life history as you, and 
yet you and I do not exist. You can see this if you imagine that before this 
world exists you are shown a film of what is going to happen in it; and the 
film in some way shows you what will be the mental lives of the people 
in the world. You would still not know—are you going to live one of the 
lives in this world? And if so, which one? So being me does not entail hav-
ing any of the particular mental or physical properties which I have; nor 
does having all the mental and physical properties which I have entail be-
ing me. Each person, and so the essential part of each person—his or her 
soul—has a “thisness,” a uniqueness which makes it the soul it is quite 
apart from the particular mental properties it has (the life it has led).
A body is a physical substance which is mine if and only if: (1) I am 
able to move it as a basic act (that is without needing to do something else 
intentionally in order to make it move); and (2) it is a substance, whose 
changing states (caused by changes elsewhere in the physical world, e.g., 
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via rays of light or sound) is the means by which I learn about the rest 
of the world; and (3) whose states may cause me pain or pleasure. Finite 
creatures have limited basic powers and means of knowledge acquisition, 
and the smallness of our bodies provides those limits. And if we are to 
interact with other people, our bodies must be public objects where others 
can get hold of us. Without bodies we would be solitary creatures. Hence 
the goodness of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. But 
what makes a body my body is its connection with my soul; and it is only 
the continuing existence of my soul after my death which would make 
possible the resurrection of a body which is mine; that would consist in a 
body being joined again to my soul.7
Oxford University
7This paper defends a view developed at length in my book The Evolution of the Soul, sec-
ond edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), using new tools (“informative” and “uninfor-
mative” designators) to rebut objections. There is a fuller rigorous account of this view in my 
paper, “From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism” in  Persons, Human and Divine, 
ed. P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). The ma-
terial of the first part of this paper is similar to material already published in Russian in two 
places: ‘The Interaction of Body and Soul,’ pp. 240–47 in The Teaching of the Church about Man, 
Proceedings of a Conference published by the Synodical Theological Commission of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church, 2002; and chapter 5 of my Is there a God, Russian translation published 
by Praxis, 2001 and republished by St Andrew’s Biblical-Theological Institute, 2006. The ma-
terial of the second part of the paper has not been published previously in Russian.
